1 - 8
1. Trading agents [2011]
- Wellman, Michael P.
- Cham, Switzerland : Springer, ©2011.
- Description
- Book — 1 online resource (xiii, 93 pages) : illustrations
- Summary
-
- Introduction Example: Bidding on eBay Auction Fundamentals Continuous Double Auctions Interdependent Markets Conclusion.
- (source: Nielsen Book Data)
(source: Nielsen Book Data)
2. Trading agents [electronic resource] [2011]
- Wellman, Michael P.
- San Rafael, Calif. (1537 Fourth Street, San Rafael, CA 94901 USA) : Morgan & Claypool, c2011.
- Description
- Book — 1 electronic text (xiii, 93 p.).
- Summary
-
- Introduction Example: Bidding on eBay Auction Fundamentals Continuous Double Auctions Interdependent Markets Conclusion.
- (source: Nielsen Book Data)
(source: Nielsen Book Data)
- Wellman, Michael P.
- Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, c2007.
- Description
- Book — xi, 238 p. : ill. ; 24 cm.
- Summary
-
- Introduction
- The tac travel-shopping game
- Bidding in interdependent markets
- Price prediction
- Bidding with price predictions
- Machine learning and adaptivity
- Market-specific bidding strategies
- Experimental methods and strategic analysis
- Conclusion.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)
- Wellman, Michael P.
- Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, ©2007.
- Description
- Book — 1 online resource (xi, 238 pages) : illustrations Digital: data file.
- Summary
-
- Introduction
- The tac travel-shopping game
- Bidding in interdependent markets
- Price prediction
- Bidding with price predictions
- Machine learning and adaptivity
- Market-specific bidding strategies
- Experimental methods and strategic analysis
- Conclusion.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)
Overview and analysis of algorithmic advances developed within an integrated bidding agent architecture that emerged from recent research in a growing domain of AI. E-commerce increasingly provides opportunities for autonomous bidding agents: computer programs that bid in electronic markets without direct human intervention. Automated bidding strategies for an auction of a single good with a known valuation are fairly straightforward; designing strategies for simultaneous auctions with interdependent valuations is a more complex undertaking. This book presents algorithmic advances and strategy ideas within an integrated bidding agent architecture that have emerged from recent work in this fast-growing area of research in academia and industry. The authors analyze several novel bidding approaches that developed from the Trading Agent Competition (TAC), held annually since 2000. The benchmark challenge for competing agents-to buy and sell multiple goods with interdependent valuations in simultaneous auctions of different types-encourages competitors to apply innovative techniques to a common task. The book traces the evolution of TAC and follows selected agents from conception through several competitions, presenting and analyzing detailed algorithms developed for autonomous bidding. Autonomous Bidding Agents provides the first integrated treatment of methods in this rapidly developing domain of AI. The authors-who introduced TAC and created some of its most successful agents-offer both an overview of current research and new results.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)
- Wellman, Michael P.
- London : Pitman ; San Mateo, Calif. : M. Kaufmann Publishers, 1990.
- Description
- Book — 182 p. : ill. ; 25 cm.
- Online
SAL3 (off-campus storage)
SAL3 (off-campus storage) | Status |
---|---|
Stacks | Request (opens in new tab) |
Q335 .W43 1990 | Available |
6. Planning and control [1991]
- Dean, Thomas L., 1950-
- Los Altos, Calif. : M. Kaufmann Publishers, c1991.
- Description
- Book — xv, 486 p. : ill. ; 24 cm.
- Summary
-
Techniques from artificial intelligence, control theory, operations research, and the decision sciences are invoked in this text/reference devoted to the design of complex systems for applications in robotics, automated manufacturing, and time-critical decision support systems. Annotation copyri Bo.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)
- Online
SAL3 (off-campus storage)
SAL3 (off-campus storage) | Status |
---|---|
Stacks | Request (opens in new tab) |
TJ213 .D35 1991 | Available |
Online 7. Exploring Bidding Strategies for Market-Based Scheduling [2002]
- MacKie-Mason Jeffrey K. (Author)
- Stanford (Calif.) : Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics, 2002
- Description
- Book — 1 online resource
- Summary
-
A market-based scheduling mechanism allocates resources indexed by time to alternative uses based on the bids of participating agents. Agents are typically interested in multiple time slots of the schedulable resource, with value determined by the earliest deadline by which they can complete their corresponding tasks. Despite the strong complementarities among slots induced by such preferences, it is often infeasible to deploy a mechanismthat coordinates allocation across all time slots. We explore the case of separate, simultaneous markets for individual time slots, and the strategic problem it poses for bidding agents. Investigation of the straightforward bidding policy and its variants indicates that the efficacy of particular strategies depends critically on preferences and strategies of other agents, and that the strategy space is far too complex to yield to general game-theoretic analysis. For particular environments, however, it is often possible to derive constrained equilibria through evolutionary search methods.
- Digital collection
- Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics (SITE) Archives
- Description
- Book
- Online
SAL3 (off-campus storage)
SAL3 (off-campus storage) | Status |
---|---|
Stacks | Request (opens in new tab) |
134355 | Available |
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