• The market
• Budget constraint
• Preferences
• Utility
• Choice
• Demand
• Revealed preference
• Slutsky equation
• Buying and selling
• Intertemporal choice
• Asset markets
• Uncertainty
• Risky assets
• Consumer's surplus
• Market demand
• Equilibrium
• Measurement
• Auctions
• Technology
• Profit maximization
• Cost minimization
• Cost curves
• Firm supply
• Industry supply
• Monopoly
• Monopoly behavior
• Factor markets
• Oligopoly
• Game theory
• Game applications
• Behavioral economics
• Exchange
• Production
• Welfare
• Externalities
• Information technology
• Public goods
• Asymmetric information
• Mathematical appendix.

This best-selling text is still the most modern presentation of the subject. The Varian approach gives students tools they can use on exams, in the rest of their classes, and in their careers after graduation.
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• 1) Introduction Part I: Representations and Basic Assumptions 2) The Extensive Form 3) Strategies and the Normal Form 4) Beliefs, Mixed Strategies, and Expected Payoffs 5) General Assumptions and Methodology
• Part II: Analyzing Behavior in Static Settings 6) Dominance and Best Response 7) Rationalizability and Iterated Dominance 8) Location, Partnership, and Social Unrest 9) Nash Equilibrium 10) Oligopoly, Tariffs, Crime, and Voting 11) Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium 12) Strictly Competitive Games and Security Strategies 13) Contract, Law, and Enforcement in Static Settings
• Part III: Analyzing Behavior in Dynamic Settings 14) Details of the Extensive Form 15) Sequential Rationality and Solution Concepts 16) Topics in Industrial Organization 17) Parlor Games 18) Bargaining Problems 19) Analysis of Simple Bargaining Games 20) Games with Joint Decisions-- Negotiation Equilibrium 21) Unverifiable Investment, Hold Up, Options, And Ownership 22) Repeated Games and Reputation 23) Collusion, Trade Agreements, and Goodwill
• Part IV: Information 24) Random Events and Incomplete Information 25) Risk and Incentives in Contracting 26) Bayesian Nash Equilibrium and Rationalizability 27) Lemons, Auctions, and Information Aggregation 28) Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium 29) Job-Market Signaling and Reputation
• Appendices A) Review of Mathematics B) The Mathematics of Rationalizability and Existence of Nash Equilibirum
• Index.
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

Joel Watson has refined his successful text to make it even more student-friendly. A number of sections have been added, and numerous chapters have been substantially revised. Dozens of new exercises have been added, along with solutions to selected exercises. Chapters are short and focused, with just the right amount of mathematical content and end-of-chapter exercises. New passages walk students through tricky topics.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• 1Static Games of Complete Information 1.1Basic Theory: Narmal-Form Games and Nash Equilibrium 1.1.ANormal-Form Representation of Games 1.1.BIterated Elimination of Strictly Dominated Strategies 1.1.CMotivation and Definition of Nash Equilibriuin 1.2Applications 1.2.ACournot Model of Duopoly 1.2.BBertrand Model of Duopoly 1.2.CFinal-Offer Arbitration 1.2.DThe Problem of the Commons 1.3Advanced Theory: Mixed Strategies and Existence of Equilibriutn 1.3.AMixed Strategies 1.3.BExistence of Nash Equilibrium 2Dynamic Games of Complete Information 2.1Dynamic Games of Complete and Perfect Information 2.1.ATheory: Backwards Induction 2.1.BStackelberg Model of Duopoly 2.1.CWages and Employment in a Unionized Firm 2.1.DSequential Bargaining 2.2Two-Stage Games of Complete but Imperfect Information 2.2.ATheory: Subgame Perfection 2.2.BBank Runs 2.2.CTariffs and Imperfect International Competition 2.2.DTournaments 2.3Repeated Games 2.3.ATheory: Two-Stage Repeated Games 2.3.BTheory: Infinitely Repeated Games 2.3.CCollusion between Cournot Duopolists 2.3.DEfficiency Wages 2.3.ETime-Consistent Monetary Policy 2.4Dynamic Games of Complete but Imperfect Information 2.4.AExtensive-Form Representation of Games 2.4.BSubgame-Perfect Nash Equilibriuin 3Static Games of Incomplete Information 3.1Theory: Static Bayesian Ganies and Bayesian Nash Equilibrium 3.1.AAn Example: Cournot Competition under Asymmetric Information 3.1.BNormal-Form Representation of Static Bayesian Games 3.1.CDefinition of Bayesian Nash Equilibrium 3.2Applications 3.2.AMixed Strategies Revisited 3.2.BAn Auction 3.2.CA Double Auction 3.3The Revelation Principle 4Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information 4.1Introduction to Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium 4.2Signaling Games 4.2.APerfect Bayesian Equilibrium in Signaling Games 4.2.BJob-Market Signaling 4.2.CCorporate Investment and Capital Structure 4.2.DMonetary Policy 4.3Other Applications of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium 4.3.ACheap-Talk Games 4.3.BSequential Bargaining under Asymmetric Information 4.3.CReputation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemnia 4.4Refinements of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium Index.
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

This book introduces one of the most powerful tools of modern economics to a wide audience: those who will later construct or consume game-theoretic models. Robert Gibbons addresses scholars in applied fields within economics who want a serious and thorough discussion of game theory but who may have found other works overly abstract. Gibbons emphasizes the economic applications of the theory at least as much as the pure theory itself; formal arguments about abstract games play a minor role. The applications illustrate the process of model building--of translating an informal description of a multi-person decision situation into a formal game-theoretic problem to be analyzed. Also, the variety of applications shows that similar issues arise in different areas of economics, and that the same game-theoretic tools can be applied in each setting. In order to emphasize the broad potential scope of the theory, conventional applications from industrial organization have been largely replaced by applications from labor, macro, and other applied fields in economics. The book covers four classes of games, and four corresponding notions of equilibrium: static games of complete information and Nash equilibrium, dynamic games of complete information and subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, static games of incomplete information and Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and dynamic games of incomplete information and perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)