"The management and oversight of a major defense acquisition program are exceedingly complex processes. The U.S. Department of Defense has a well-established set of policies, procedures, and organizations for program management and oversight, described in the '5000 series' of directives and instructions. Not all weapon systems fit comfortably within this framework, however. In particular, ship acquisition programs have characteristics that deviate from the normal framework, including concurrency of production and subsystem development, low production quantity and rate, varied test and evaluation procedures, and a unique relationship between milestone decision points and actual construction status. The authors explore these differences in detail, suggesting policies that can better account for the differences in ship acquisition programs without compromising oversight or establishing an entirely separate process."--Publisher's description.
Book — 1 online resource (xxvii, 142 pages) : illustrations
The Arsenal Ship acquisition program was unique in two respects: it represented a new operational concept for Navy weapon systems, and its management structure and process represented a significant departure from traditional military ship-building programs. The Arsenal Ship program was, in effect, an experiment; while the Navy envisioned an array of mission capabilities for the ship, it set the project budget as the single immovable requirement. In the end, political and financial constraints caused the program's cancellation. Nevertheless, its acquisition approach and technical innovations have already had--and will continue to have--significant influence on other Navy ship-building programs. The lessons learned from the Arsenal Ship program, applied to existing and planned systems, should more than recover the money spent on it.
Woodbridge, Suffolk, UK ; Rochester, NY : Boydell Press, 2010.
Book — xvii, 264 p. : maps ; 25 cm.
During the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, the Royal Navy increased its manpower from fewer than 20,000 to more than 147,000 men, with a concomitant increase in the quantities of food and drink required to sustain them. The organisation responsible for this, the Victualling Board, performed its tasks using techniques and systems which it had developed over the previous 110 years. In terms of actually delivering supplies to warships, troopships and army garrisons abroad, the Victualling Board performed well given the constraints of long-distance communications and intermittent difficulties in obtaining supplies. However, its other areas of responsibility showed poor performance, as evidenced by the reports of several Parliamentary enquiries. This book examines in detail the processes by which the Victualling Board performed its core and non-core tasks, identifying the areas of competence and incompetence, and establishing the underlying causes of the incompetencies. JANET MACDONALD, author of the highly acclaimed Feeding Nelson's Navy (Chatham, 2004), has recently completed a thesis at King's College London. After a business career, and running an equestrian organisation, she spent ten years as a freelance writer, publishing more than thirty books. (source: Nielsen Book Data)
Gainesville, FL : University Press of Florida, c2009.
Book — xxxiv, 320 p. : ill., maps ; 25 cm.
Though completely unsung and commonly left out of battle histories, nothing is more important than the details of logistics and support operations during a military campaign. Without fuel, food, transport, communications, and medical facilities, modern military engagement would be impossible. Peter Nash compares the methods the British and American navies developed to supply their ships across the vast reaches of the Pacific Ocean during the first part of the twentieth century. He argues that the logistics challenges faced by the navies during World War II were so profound and required such innovative solutions that the outcome was the most radical turning point in the history of mobile logistics support. He shows how the lessons learned during the final campaign against Japan were successfully implemented during the Korean War and transformed the way naval expeditionary force is projected to this day. The foreword was written by the Royal Navy's current Second Sea Lord, Vice Admiral Sir Alan Massey. (source: Nielsen Book Data)