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• Chapter. 1. Autonomous Intelligent Cyber-defense Agent: Introduction and Overview
• Chapter. 2. Alternative Architectural Approaches
• Chapter. 3. Perception of Environment
• Chapter. 4. Perception of Cyber Threats
• Chapter. 5. Situational Understanding and Diagnostics
• Chapter. 6. Learning about the Adversary
• Chapter. 7. Response Planning
• Chapter. 8. Recovery Planning
• Chapter. 9. Strategic Cyber Camouflage
• Chapter. 10. Adaptivity & Antifragility
• Chapter. 11. Negotiation and Collaboration
• Chapter. 12. Human Interactions
• Chapter. 13. Testing and Measurements
• Chapter. 14. Deployment and Operation
• Chapter. 15. Command in AICA-intensive Operations
• Chapter. 16. Risk Management
• Chapter. 17. Policy Issues
• Chapter. 18. Development Challenges
• Chapter. 19. Case Study A: A Prototype Autonomous Intelligent Cyber-defense Agent
• Chapter. 20. Case Study B: AI Agents for Tactical Edge
• Chapter. 21. Case Study C: the Sentinel Agents.

This book offers a structured overview and a comprehensive guide to the emerging field of Autonomous Intelligent Cyber Defense Agents (AICA). The book discusses the current technical issues in autonomous cyber defense and offers information on practical design approaches. The material is presented in a way that is accessible to non-specialists, with tutorial information provided in the initial chapters and as needed throughout the book. The reader is provided with clear and comprehensive background and reference material for each aspect of AICA. Todays cyber defense tools are mostly watchers. They are not active doers. They do little to plan and execute responses to attacks, and they dont plan and execute recovery activities. Response and recovery core elements of cyber resilience are left to human cyber analysts, incident responders and system administrators. This is about to change. The authors advocate this vision, provide detailed guide to how such a vision can be realized in practice, and its current state of the art. This book also covers key topics relevant to the field, including functional requirements and alternative architectures of AICA, how it perceives and understands threats and the overall situation, how it plans and executes response and recovery, how it survives threats, and how human operators deploy and control AICA. Additionally, this book covers issues of testing, risk, and policy pertinent to AICA, and provides a roadmap towards future R&D in this field. This book targets researchers and advanced students in the field of cyber defense and resilience. Professionals working in this field as well as developers of practical products for cyber autonomy will also want to purchase this book.

In a time where US deployments are uncertain, this book shows how US service members can either build the necessary support to sustain their presence or create added animosity towards the military presence. The United States stands at a crossroads in international security. The backbone of its international position for the last 70 years has been the massive network of overseas military deployments. However, the US now faces pressures to limit its overseas presence and spending. In Beyond the Wire, Michael Allen, Michael Flynn, Carla Martinez Machain, and Andrew Stravers argue that the US has entered into a "Domain of Competitive Consent" where the longevity of overseas deployments relies upon the buy-in from host-state populations and what other major powers offer in security guarantees. Drawing from three years of surveys and interviews across fourteen countries, they demonstrate that a key component of building support for the US mission is the service members themselves as they interact with local community members. Highlighting both the positive contact and economic benefits that flow from military deployments and the negative interactions like crime and anti-base protests, this book shows in the most rigorous and concrete way possible how US policy on the ground shapes its ability to advance its foreign policy goals.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• Permissible Defensive Harm & Liability
• The Evidence-Relative View of Liability Attribution
• The Evidence-Relative View and Intricate Symmetries
• A Defense of Revisionist Just War Theory
• A New Proposal for Liability in War
• The Puzzle of Benevolent Aggression
• Towards a New Liberal Theory of Just War
• Answering Calvin

• The 1977-1982 Tripartite Test Ban Treaty Negotiations and Aftermath
• British Nuclear Tests 1974-1982 and Test Ban Pressures
• Stockpile Reliability and Safety and the Test Ban: UK concerns
• Chevaline and Successor Systems
• Strategic and Tactical
• Conclusion: British Nuclear Weapons and the Test Ban 1974-1982

"This book discuss the key concepts that philosophers and generals of this era developed to grasp and influence the dramatic and horrific phenomenon of war"-- Provided by publisher

"This book discuss the key concepts that philosophers and generals of this era developed to grasp and influence the dramatic and horrific phenomenon of war"-- Provided by publisher.

• Le divorce millénaire entre la tactique et la stratégie
• Tactique, stratégie et art opératif : la guerre fait ménage à trois
• La guerre du Péloponnèse : l'enchère mortelle de Périclès
• Solutions tactiques et guerres sans solutions
• L'intermède du génie napoléonien
• La bataille gagnée ne décide pas de la victoire !
• La guerre de Sécession : la victoire par des moyens indirects
• La Première Guerre mondiale : l'impuissance et l'impasse
• 1917-1918 : l'Allemagne révolutionne la tactique mais perd la guerre
• Strategiia (1) : et Sviétchine vint réunifier l'art de la guerre
• Lieu de naissance de l'art opératif : la Russie bolchevique
• Alexandre Sviétchine, professeur à l'académie Frounzé
• Strategiia, le grand livre de l'art opératif
• Qu'est-ce qu'une opération ?
• Les formes de l'opération : destruction et attrition
• Offensive et défensive
• Il n'y a pas de formule du succès
• Le Stratège et le Souverain
• Strategiia (2) : concevoir et mener une opération
• La stratégie fixe ses buts à l'opération
• Les quatre étapes de la planification opérative
• Une fausse séquence opérative : El-Alamein
• Le modèle de l'opération Uranus
• Au cœur de l'art opératif, la ligne de conduite stratégique
• La courbe d'intensité stratégique
• Le problème du moment initial
• La "percée" selon Sviétchine : le paroxysme opératif
• La question des réserves
• Armée rouge et art opératif
• La mort de Sviétchine et son héritage
• Toukhatchevski, visionnaire et mégalomane
• La doctrine de la bataille dans la profondeur
• La doctrine de l'opération dans la profondeur
• Les échelons opératifs
• Le Front, acteur opératif majeur
• L'art opératif en l'air et sur mer
• De plusieurs idées fausses sur l'art opératif
• L'échec du volet aérien de l'art opératif soviétique
• Les enseignements aériens de la Grande Guerre
• Les formes d'opérations aériennes
• Deux chefs-d'œuvre aériens
• L'art opératif et la mer
• La crise de la stratégie après 1945
• Quand le nucléaire met la pensée opérative soviétique sous le boisseau
• Renaissance de la pensée opérative soviétique
• L'ère des techniciens
• La stratégie désaccouplée de la politique
• Les Soviétiques politiquement aveugles en Afghanistan
• Le contresens sur les conflits pseudo-périphériques de la guerre froide
• L'art opératif est-il passé à l'ouest ?
• La crise du système militaire américain
• D'Active Defense à AirLand Baffle
• La définition d'un niveau opérationnel de la guerre
• De quelques traits de la culture politique américaine
• Desert Storm : le moment clausewitzien des États-Unis
• Révolution dans les affaires militaires et rejet de la stratégie
• Et la France dans tout ça ?
• Une hypothèse finale.

"Pourquoi, depuis l'Antiquité, tant de guerres ont-elles duré si longtemps et ne se sont-elles achevées qu'en raison d'événements extérieurs, plutôt que par le verdict des combats ? En d'autres termes, pourquoi le sang versé sert-il si peu à atteindre la victoire ? Tel est le paradoxe profond et ignoré qu'un général russe passé du tsar au service des bolcheviks, Alexandre Sviétchine, a tenté de dénouer au lendemain de la Grande Guerre. Il a pour cela inventé une discipline mettant réellement les combats au service de la stratégie : l'art opératif. Afin de donner aux lecteurs français une vision claire de ce qui constitue l'une des plus importantes révolutions dans la pensée militaire, Jean Lopez a mené une série d'entretiens avec Benoist Bihan, sans doute un des seuls stratégistes français à avoir assimilé en profondeur l'œuvre de Sviétchine. Il en résulte un vaste tour d'horizon critique des guerres, depuis Périclès jusqu'à l'orée de notre siècle. Strategiia, l'immense livre du penseur russe, est decortiqué, ses idées maîtresses exposées et éclairées par des exemples historiques. Quelle armée l'a compris et en a fait usage ? L'Armée rouge, oui, mais dans un cadre stratégique largement faussé. L'U S Army, et les armées de l'OTAN derrière elle ? Les Américains le prétendent, mais ce qu'ils entendent par "art opérationnel" est-il vraiment la même chose que l'art opératif ? Au fil des pages, le lecteur est ainsi amené à entrer au cœur des doctrines et des cultures militaires, toujours entendues dans leur rapport à la politique. Cet ouvrage est un tour de force de vulgarisation accessible aux néophytes comme aux décideurs, aux militaires et aux passionnés d'histoire. 11 constitue un formidable outil de compréhension de ce qu'est la guerre et, comme tel, il se destine à tout citoyen au moment où le fracas des combats se rapproche de notre pays."--Page 4 of cover.

Counterinsurgency, the violent suppression of armed insurrection, is among the dominant kinds of war in contemporary world politics. Often linked to protecting populations and reconstructing legitimate political orders, it has appeared in other times and places in very different forms - and has taken on a range of politics in doing so. How did it arrive at its present form, and what generated these others, along the way? Spanning several centuries and four detailed case studies, 'The Counterinsurgent Imagination' unpacks and explores this intellectual history through counterinsurgency manuals. These military theoretical and instructional texts, and the practitioners who produced them, made counterinsurgency possible in practice. By interrogating these processes, this book explains how counter-insurrectionary war eventually took on its late twentieth and early twenty-first century forms.

• Why is there no escalation in cyberspace?
• Four attributes of cyber operations
• A theory of cyber escalation
• Restraint and accommodation : how cyber operations can diffuse crises
• Patterns of escalation in cyberspace
• Cyber operations and the de-escalation of international crises
• Plausible escalation scenarios for the future : cyber operations in a warfighting context
• Implications for policymaking

• The high command from Julian to Theodosius I (361-395 AD)
• The late emergence of the eastern Notitia-system (395-450 AD)
• The "classic" phase of the eastern field armies (450-506 AD)
• The dispersal and decline of the eastern field armies (506-630 AD.

"Presenting a bold re-interpretation of the history of the east Roman field armies that corrects longstanding mistakes in the interpretation and weighing of evidence (especially the Notitia dignitatum), this volume will be of critical interest to students and scholars of late Roman history, and particularly administrative and military affairs"-- Provided by publisher.

• Cover
• Half-title page
• Title page
• Copyright page
• Contents
• List of Contributors
• Acknowledgments
• Introduction: The Ethics of War after the Longest War
• Chapter 1 The Lament of the Demobilized
• When Justification Comes to Grief
• War, the Face, the Face-to-Face
• The Face as Site of Revelation
• Chapter 2 Moral Injury and Moral Failure
• Introduction
• Experiences of Moral Injury
• Reactive Attitudes
• Right and Wrong Kinds of Reasons
• The Unthinkable
• Conclusion
• Chapter 3 Stoic Grit, Moral Injury, and Resilience
• Case of Accidental Killing

• A Tension: Moral Injury vs. Stoic Resilience
• Moral Injury and Reactive Attitudes
• Stoic Emotions and the Moral Progressor
• The Tears of Alcibiades
• Seneca's Plea for Mercy
• A Plea for Self-Empathy
• Chapter 4 Political Humiliation and the Sense of Replacement
• Humiliation in Politics
• The Sense of Replacement
• Why We Need to Understand the Sense of Replacement
• Conclusion
• Chapter 5 Minimum Moral Thresholds at War's End
• Just War Theory and Transitional Justice: A Brief Overview
• Just War Theory
• Transitional Justice
• The Critical Turn

• Minimal Thresholds for Normative Success
• Conclusion
• Chapter 6 Ending Endless Wars
• Understanding Endless Wars
• Explaining Endless Wars
• Ending Endless Wars
• Chapter 7 Forever Wars: Time and Value in War
• Endless Wars and Jus ad Bellum
• Proportionality and Indeterminacy
• Time-Relative Value and Proportionality
• Discounting Human Costs
• Conclusion
• Chapter 8 Two Conceptions of the Proportionality Budget for Jus Ex Bello
• The Impersonal Value Conception
• The Personal Value Conception
• Distinctions in Value
• Disrespect and the Pacifist Challenge

• Both Smooth and Chunky
• Concluding Comments
• Chapter 9 Toward a Post Bellum Lieber Code
• Jus Post Bellum and the Focus on Strategy
• Post Bellum Paradoxes
• Jus Post Bellum Has Not Been Part of the Discussion on the Ground
• Right Conduct After War but Before Peace?
• Post Bellum Premises
• Seven Themes of Prosecuting Crime and War
• the Common Values
• Conclusion
• Table of Cases
• Chapter 10 Reconciliation Is Justice
• and a Strategy for Military Victory
• The Liberal Peace
• Reconciliation in Iraq
• Realism, Religion, and Reconciliation
• Bibliography
• Index

Treats the challenges of moving from a state of war to post-war as central to military ethics, strategy, and law.

• Soviet collapse and nuclear weapons
• Preventing Soviet nuclear disintegration
• The road to Lisbon : proliferation vs. succession
• Belarus and Kazakhstan : paths not taken
• The road to nuclear renunciation
• From renunciation to ownership
• Nuclear ownership and deterrence
• From ownership to renunciation.

"The author investigates the history and politics surrounding the prevention of what could have been the single largest wave of nuclear proliferation when the Soviet collapse led to the emergence of three new nuclear states: Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine"-- Provided by publisher.

• Soviet collapse and nuclear weapons
• Preventing Soviet nuclear disintegration
• The road to Lisbon : proliferation vs. succession
• Belarus and Kazakhstan : paths not taken
• The road to nuclear renunciation
• From renunciation to ownership
• Nuclear ownership and deterrence
• From ownership to renunciation

"The author investigates the history and politics surrounding the prevention of what could have been the single largest wave of nuclear proliferation when the Soviet collapse led to the emergence of three new nuclear states: Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine"-- Provided by publisher