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• 1. On political judgement
• 2. The need for richer explanation
• 3. A Durkheimian theoretical framework
• 4. October 1962, before and after
• 5. The Khrushchev regime
• 6. The Kennedy administration
• 7. The Castro revolutionary regime
• 8. Implications
• 9. Coda.
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

What is political judgement? Why do politicians exhibit such contrasting thought styles in making decisions, even when they agree ideologically? What happens when governments with contrasting thought styles have to deal with each other? In this book Perri 6 presents a fresh, rigorous explanatory theory of judgement, its varieties and its consequences, drawing upon Durkheim and Douglas. He argues that policy makers will understand - and misunderstand - their problems and choices in ways that reproduce their own social organisation. This theory is developed by using the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 as an extended case study, examining the decision-making of the Kennedy, Castro and Khrushchev regimes. Explaining Political Judgement is the first comprehensive study to show what a neo-Durkheimian institutional approach can offer to political science and to the social sciences generally.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• v. 1. Private life and public policy
• v. 2. Public trust and the use of private information / Perri 6 with Kristen Lasky and Adrian Fletcher.

• 1. On political judgement
• 2. The need for richer explanation
• 3. A Durkheimian theoretical framework
• 4. October 1962, before and after
• 5. The Khrushchev regime
• 6. The Kennedy administration
• 7. The Castro revolutionary regime
• 8. Implications
• 9. Coda.
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

What is political judgement? Why do politicians exhibit such contrasting thought styles in making decisions, even when they agree ideologically? What happens when governments with contrasting thought styles have to deal with each other? In this book Perri 6 presents a fresh, rigorous explanatory theory of judgement, its varieties and its consequences, drawing upon Durkheim and Douglas. He argues that policy makers will understand - and misunderstand - their problems and choices in ways that reproduce their own social organisation. This theory is developed by using the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 as an extended case study, examining the decision-making of the Kennedy, Castro and Khrushchev regimes. Explaining Political Judgement is the first comprehensive study to show what a neo-Durkheimian institutional approach can offer to political science and to the social sciences generally.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• 1. Introduction
• 2. Narratives of origin and change
• 3. Sovereignty as institution
• 4. Sovereignty as identity
• 5. Sovereignty as a (language) game
• 6. Sovereignty as subjectivity
• 7. Conclusion.
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

This book explores the interplay between sovereignty, politics and law through different conceptualizations of sovereignty. Despite developments such as European integration, globalization, and state failure, sovereignty proves to be a resilient institution in contemporary international politics. This book investigates both the continuity and change of sovereignty through an examination of the different ways it is understood; sovereignty as an institution, as identity; as a (language) game; and as subjectivity. In this illuminating book, Aalberts examines sovereign statehood as a political-legal concept, an institutional product of modern international society, and seeks an interdisciplinary approach that combines international relations and international law. This book traces the consequences of this origin for the conceptualization of sovereign statehood in modern academic discourse, drawing on key jurisprudence and international treaties, and provides a new framework to consider the international significance of sovereignty. As an innovative approach to a critical institution, Constructing Sovereignty between Politics and Law will be of interest to students and scholars of international relations, international relations theory and international law.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• Series Editors' Foreword
• 1. Introduction 1.1 Elections in authoritarian regimes 1.2 Extending elections to the subnational level 1.3 The argument of the book 1.4 Conceptualisation and methods 1.5 Outline of the book
• 2. Four Strategies of Manipulation 2.1 Advocating for decentralisation after the Cold War 2.2 How decentralisation failed to deliver 2.3 Why some governments decentralise 2.4 Strategies for Manipulating Political Decentralisation 2.5 Possibilities for contestation and participation 2.6 Conclusions
• 3. The Requirements of Political Decentralisation 3.1 Unpacking the relationship between regime type and decentralisation 3.2 Elections as hallmarks of political decentralisation 3.3 Requirements for representative subnational governments 3.4 The Four Ways of Manipulating Political Decentralisation 3.5 Case selection 3.6 Conclusions
• 4. Decentralisation through dominance in Ethiopia 4.1 Ethiopia under EPRDF: Decentralisation and autocratisation side by side 4.2 The requirements of representative subnational governments and their challenges 4.3 Manipulating political decentralisation through dominance 4.4 No contestation but mass-participation 4.5 Conclusions
• 5. Institutional interruption in Malawi 5.1 Regime and stalled political decentralisation 5.2 The requirements of representative subnational governments 5.3 Identifying Manipulation Strategies 5.4 Opportunities for Contestation and Participation 5.5 Conclusion
• 6. Overwhelming the opposition in Uganda 6.1 The decentralising autocrat 6.2 The requirements of representative subnational governments 6.3 Identifying Manipulation Strategies 6.4 Opportunities for Contestation and Participation 6.5 Conclusion
• 7. Regionalised opposition in South Africa 7.1 Democracy and the dominant position of ANC 7.2 The requirements for representative subnational governments 7.3 Manipulating Political Decentralisation 7.4 Consequences for contestation and participation 7.5 Conclusion
• 8. Conclusions 8.1 The five requirements of representative SNGs 8.2 Manipulation strategies and the space for contestation and participation 8.3 Extension to other cases 8.4 The challenges of measuring and comparing local government 8.5 Inclusive autocrats 8.6 The way forward.
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

Can autocrats establish representative subnational governments? And which strategies of manipulation are available if they would like to reduce the uncertainty caused by introducing political decentralisation? In the wake of local government reforms, several states across the world have introduced legislation that provides for subnational elections. This does not mean that representative subnational governments in these countries are all of a certain standard. Political decentralisation should not be confused with democratisation, as the process is likely to be manipulated in ways that do not produce meaningful avenues for political participation and contestation locally.ã Using examples from Africa, Lovise Aalen and Ragnhild L. Muriaas propose five requirements for representative subnational governments and four strategies that national governments might use to manipulate the outcome of political decentralisation. The case studies of Ethiopia, Malawi, South Africa, and Uganda illustrate why autocrats sometimes are more open to competition at the subnational level than democrats. Manipulating Political Decentralisation provides a new conceptual tool to assess representative subnational governments' quality, aiding us to build theories on the consequences of political decentralisation on democratisation.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)