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• Introduction: Off-brand me
• Part one: Double life. Occupied
• Enter Covid, the threat multiplier
• My failed brand, or Call me by her name
• Meeting myself in the wood
• Part two: Mirror world. They know about cell phones
• Diagonal lines
• MAGA's plus-one
• Ridiculously serious, seriously speechless
• The far right meets the far-out
• Autism and the anti-vax prequel
• Part three: Shadow lands. Calm, conspiracy ... capitalism
• No way out buy back
• The Nazi in the mirror
• The unshakable ethnic double
• Part four: Facing the real. Unselfing
• Epilogue: Who is the double?

"What if you woke up one morning and found you'd acquired another self--a double who was almost you and yet not you at all? What if that double shared many of your preoccupations but, in a twisted, upside-down way, furthered the very causes you'd devoted your life to fighting against? Not long ago, the celebrated activist and public intellectual Naomi Klein had just such an experience--she was confronted with a doppelganger whose views she found abhorrent but whose name and public persona were sufficiently similar to her own that many people got confused about who was who. Destabilized, she lost her bearings, until she began to understand the experience as one manifestation of a strangeness many of us have come to know but struggle to define: AI-generated text is blurring the line between genuine and spurious communication; New Age wellness entrepreneurs turned anti-vaxxers are scrambling familiar political allegiances of left and right; and liberal democracies are teetering on the edge of absurdist authoritarianism, even as the oceans rise. Under such conditions, reality itself seems to have become unmoored. Is there a cure for our moment of collective vertigo? Naomi Klein is one of our most trenchant and influential social critics, an essential analyst of what branding, austerity, and climate profiteering have done to our societies and souls. Here she turns her gaze inward to our psychic landscapes, and outward to the possibilities for building hope amid intersecting economic, medical, and political crises. With the assistance of Sigmund Freud, Jordan Peele, Alfred Hitchcock, and bell hooks, among other accomplices, Klein uses wry humor and a keen sense of the ridiculous to face the strange doubles that haunt us--and that have come to feel as intimate and proximate as a warped reflection in the mirror. Combining comic memoir with chilling reportage and cobweb-clearing analysis, Klein seeks to smash that mirror and chart a path beyond despair. Doppelganger asks: What do we neglect as we polish and perfect our digital reflections? Is it possible to dispose of our doubles and overcome the pathologies of a culture of multiplication? Can we create a politics of collective care and undertake a true reckoning with historical crimes? The result is a revelatory treatment of the way many of us think and feel now--and an intellectual adventure story for our times"-- Amazon.com.

""Nous sommes devenus superforts. Rien ne peut nous résister : la plus grande œuvre d'art, l'action la plus héroïque, l'entreprise la plus noble, la figure la plus impeccable - elles ne le sont que pour autant que nous le voulions bien. Chacun d'entre nous, partout dans le monde, et quoi qu'il en soit de sa richesse ou de sa pauvreté, de sa culture ou de son ignorance, nous sommes plus forts que tout. La superforce est la condition contemporaine de l'être humain. Pour nous, humains du XXIe siècle, plus de réalité qui ne soit bornée par un "Oui, mais". Qui, aujourd'hui, sauf un abruti ou un niais, oserait dire qu'il n'est pas critique ? Qu'il ou elle n'a pas d'esprit critique ? La raison moderne, la raison critique, parce qu'elle est d'abord une interrogation sur elle-même, comme l'avait dit Emmanuel Kant, ne peut connaître d'autre limite ni d'autre alternative qu'elle-même. De sorte qu'elle a fini par dévorer la totalité du champ du pensable. Il est temps de faire le point sur le programme critique et de se poser la question de ce qu'il a laissé de côté. Et la réponse que je propose est : il a laissé de côté le futur. Il n'y a pas d'après de la critique, parce que l'idéal de la critique est le champ de ruine où survivrait une luciole, où pousserait une pâquerette." Dans ce livre-étendard d'une génération nouvelle, scintillant d'idées, d'arguments et d'exemples, Laurent de Sutter appelle à renouer avec le sens du futur, à quitter le mode du "oui, mais" pour épouser celui du "et si", à redevenir superfaibles et.. libres à nouveau."--Page 4 of cover.

• Practical reason and what we ought to do
• Prudence and what we ought to do
• Morality and what we ought to do
• Practical reason is about good things for somebody to do
• Reasons in favour
• Objections
• How to find out what are good things for one to do.

"The book is to show that the aim of thinking about what to do, of practical reason, is to find, not what we ought to do, but what is a good thing to do for us under the circumstances. So it argues, first, that neither under prudence nor under morality there are things we ought to do. There is no warrant for the idea of our being required, by natural law perhaps or by our rationality, to do either what helps us attain our ends or what is right for moral reasons. While common moral understanding is committed to there being things we ought to do and to our being guilty and deserving blame if we fail to do them, we can lay aside these notions without loss, indeed with benefit. Second, it explains what it is for something to be good for somebody to do under the circumstances and argues for understanding practical reason in these terms. What is good for somebody to do we find by experience: from what we go through we learn what helps and what hinders and figure out on this basis both what is prudentially useful and what is morally right to do - although in the end this difference itself gives way, and morality turns out to be a part of prudence"-- Provided by publisher.

• 1. Le nombre essentiel
• La théorie des puissances
• La série de l'être et du nombre
• La dimension métalogique du nombre
• 2. La dialectique sérielle
• La genèse statique
• Le vtiv et l'gcticpyriç
• La surface absolue
• 3. L'émanatisme mathématique
• La dialectique idéale
• Le symbole
• La montée vers l'absolu
• 4. La mathématique universelle
• Arithmétique et géométrie
• La loi des termes moyens
• Le schéma monadologique
• 5. Par-delà le tiers exclu
• Supernégation et méthode des divisions
• La hiérarchie
• Par-delà la trivalence
• 6. Les deux actes de l'intuitionnisme
• Le sujet créateur
• La dyade vide
• L'exode de la conscience
• 7. Par-delà la contradiction
• Le cauchemar de Frege
• La logique des paradoxes
• La structure de la Vacuité
• 8. Le tétralemme
• La troisième hérésie
• Entre scepticisme et mysticisme
• Le tétralemme de Prodos
• 9. L'ineffable
• Le principe d'identité
• Le catuekoli dans un bitreillis
• L'embrassement du désir et de la dégradation.

"La logique classique, qui repose sur trois principes fondamentaux (d'identité, de non-contradiction et de tiers-exclu), a pu séduire par son efficacité orientée vers l'être, elle permet d'appréhender la cohérence du réel, donc de développer les savoirs. Pour autant, sa puissance s'avère limitée dans certaines situations des limitations internes des formalismes à l'apparition de nouveaux objets paradoxaux, la science du XXe siècle a été confrontée à une crise de ses fondements dont elle n'est pas encore sortie. Or, s'affranchir de ce qui vient en nous entraver la pensée a été un enjeu pour des courants soucieux de fonder leur rigueur démonstrative sur un au-delà de l'être. Dans la lignée de l'hénologie néoplatonicienne, ces modes d'explication ont néanmoins souvent été jugés irrationnels, mystiques ou simplement absurdes. À l'aide des logiques non standards contemporaines, c'est une étude systémique de ces positions qui est ici envisagée à travers la critique de l'hégémonie des trois grands principes logiques grâce à la logique intuitionniste, il devient possible de construire rigoureusement la notion de néant suressentiel; grâce aux logiques paraconsistantes, les contradictions et les paradoxes qu'une telle dialectique engendre perdent leur caractère irrationnel; enfin, grâce aux traditions logiques indiennes et japonaises, le principe d'identité peut lui-même être questionné. Cette remise en cause radicale de nos certitudes les mieux ancrées permet ultimement de dégager de nouvelles perspectives à la pensée logique."--Page 4 of cover.

"The sequence is made up of select texts of the Aristotelian Organon, mostly the opening chapters of each treatise, in the traditional order, where Aristotle lays out the primary elements of reasoning. Study aids accompany these primary texts..." [taken from back cover]

"Charts the enthymeme as Aristotle's sophisticated method of logical argumentation which was fiercely debated in the Middle Age and Renaissance periods"-- Provided by publisher

• The role of audience in a theory of argumentation
• Argumentation and its issues
• Aristotle and the natures of audiences
• Perelman's audiences : a meeting of minds
• Habermas and the ideal audience
• Meaning and reasons
• Evidence and reasons : the place of testimony
• Emotion and reasons
• Agency and reasons
• Making meaning present
• Audiences and addresses : the experience of reception
• Historical arguments and elective audiences.

Many texts on argumentation theory emphasize the nature of arguers and arguments, along with various theoretical perspectives. Less attention has been given to the third feature of any argumentative situation - the audience. This book fills that gap by studying audience reception to argumentation and the problems that come to light as a result of this shift in focus. The author advances the theories of several earlier thinkers by addressing the central problems connected with audience considerations in argumentation, problems that earlier philosophical theories overlook or inadequately accommodate. The main tools employed in exploring the central issues are drawn from philosophical research on meaning, testimony, emotion and agency. These are then combined with some of the major insights of recent rhetorical work in argumentation to advance our understanding of audiences and suggest avenues for further research.--adapted from publisher's description.

• Cover; Half-title; Title page; Copyright information; Dedication; Table of contents; Preface; 1 Philosophical fictionalism; 1.1 Two species of fictionalism; 1.2 Some important aspects of fiction (or, a minor foray into philosophy of fiction); 1.3 Concerns with comparative fictionalism qua fictionalism; 1.4 The central tenets of fictionalism; 1.4.1 Some mischaracterizations of fictionalism; 1.4.2 Semantic characterizations of fictionalism; 1.5 From comparative fictionalism to philosophical fictionalism; 1.5.1 General aspects of philosophical fictionalism.

• 1.5.2 Philosophical fictionalist philosophies of fiction1.6 Philosophical fictionalism and other distinctions within fictionalism; 1.6.1 Revolutionary fictionalism versus hermeneutic fictionalism; 1.6.2 Prefix versus pretense; 1.6.2.1 The Aboutness Problem; 1.6.2.2 Responses to the Aboutness Problem; 1.6.3 Error-theoretic fictionalism versus pretense-involving fictionalism; 2 Semantic pretense-involving fictionalism and existence-talk; 2.1 Make-believe, representational aids, and partially pretend claims; 2.2 Language-world connections, long-arm conceptual roles, and M-conditions.

• 2.3 Types of pretense in partially pretend claims2.4 Pragmatic PIF and its problems; 2.4.1 Kroonś pragmatic PIF approach; 2.4.2 Kroonś accounts and the Engagement and Sophistication Complaints; 2.5 Prior SPIF accounts and the Engagement Complaints; 2.5.1 Walton and EC; 2.5.2 Yablo and EC; 2.5.3 Crimmins and EC; 2.6 Our SPIF account of existence-talk; 2.6.1 The semantic pretense behind existence-talk; 2.6.2 Our SPIF account and challenges to philosophical fictionalism; 2.6.2.1 Our SPIF account and the Engagement Complaint; 2.6.2.2 Our SPIF account and the Sophistication Complaint.

• 3 Propositional realism and a SPIF account of proposition-talk3.1 Propositions and proposition-talk; 3.2 Benacerrafś challenges as problems for propositions; 3.2.1 The non-uniqueness problem for propositions; 3.2.2 The access problem for propositions; 3.3 Our SPIF account of proposition-talk; 3.3.1 The make-believe behind proposition-talk; 3.3.1.1 Proposition Identification: Sentence form A) and Rule (P-II/A); 3.3.1.2 Proposition Description: Sentence form B) and Rule (P-III/B); 3.3.1.3 Attitude/Speech-Act Ascription: Sentence form C) and Rule (P-IV/C).

• 3.3.1.4 Meaning Attribution: Sentence forms D) and E) and Rules (P-V/D) and (P-VI/E)3.3.2 Further expressive gains; 3.3.3 Extending the background pretenses; 3.4 Our SPIF account of proposition-talk and Benacerrafś challenges; 4 T-deflationism and a SPIF account of truth-talk; 4.1 Understanding T-deflationism; 4.1.1 The expressive role of `true; ́ 4.2 From mathematical fictionalism to truth-theoretic fictionalism; 4.2.1 Yabloś figuralism; 4.2.2 From truth-talk to number-talk; 4.2.3 The expressive roles of number-talk and truth-talk; 4.2.4 Drawing the argument parallels.

"In this book, Bradley Armour-Garb and James A. Woodbridge distinguish various species of fictionalism, locating and defending their own version of philosophical fictionalism. Addressing semantic and philosophical puzzles that arise from ordinary language, they consider such issues as the problem of non-being, plural identity claims, mental-attitude ascriptions, meaning attributions, and truth-talk. They consider 'deflationism about truth', explaining why deflationists should be fictionalists, and show how their philosophical fictionalist account of truth-talk underwrites a dissolution of the Liar Paradox and its kin. They further explore the semantic notions of reference and predicate-satisfaction, showing how philosophical fictionalism can also resolve puzzles that these notions appear to present. Their critical examination of fictionalist approaches in philosophy, together with the development and application of their own brand of philosophical fictionalism, will be of great interest to scholars and upper-level students of philosophy of language, metaphysics, philosophical logic, philosophy of mind, epistemology, and linguistics"-- Provided by publisher

• Part I. The Basics : 1. Introduction to pure inductive logic ; 2. Context ; 3. Probability functions ; 4. Conditional probability ; 5. The Dutch book argument ; 6. Some basic principles ; 7. Specifying probability functions
• Part II. Unary Inductive Logic : 8. Introduction to unary pure inductive logic ; 9. de Finetti's representation theorem ; 10. Regularity and universal certainty ; 11. Relevance ; 12. Asymptotic conditional probabilities ; 13. The conditionalization theorem ; 14. Atom exchangeability ; 15. Reichenbach's axiom ; 16. Carnap's continnuum of inductive methods ; 17. Irrelevance ; 18. Another continuum of inductive methods ; 19. The NP-continuum ; 20. The weak irrelevance principle ; 21. Equalities and inequalities ; 22. Principles of analogy ; 23. Unary symmetry
• Part III. Polyadic Inductive Logic : 24. Introduction to polyadic pure inductive logic ; 25. Polyadic constant exchangeability ; 26. Polyadic regularity ; 27. Spectrum exchangeability ; 28. Conformity ; 29. The probability functions $u {\overline{p}, L} ; 30. The homogeneous/heterogeneous divide ; 31. Representation theorems for Sx ; 32. Language invariance with Sx ; 33. Sx without language invariance ; 34. A general representation theorem for Sx ; 35. The Carnap-Stegmüller principle ; 36. Instantial relevance and Sx ; 37. Equality ; 38. The polyadic Johnson's sufficientness postulate ; 39. Polyadic symmetry ; 40. Similarity ; 41. PIP and atom exchangeability ; 42. The functions $u_{\overline{E}} {\overline{p}, L} ; 43. Less well travelled roads ; Bibliography ; Index ; Symbols and abbreviations.

"Pure inductive logic is the study of rational probability treated as a branch of mathematical logic. This monograph, the first devoted to this approach, brings together the key results from the past seventy years plus the main contributions of the authors and their collaborators over the last decade to present a comprehensive account of the discipline within a single unified context. The exposition is structured around the traditional bases of rationality, such as avoiding Dutch Books, respecting symmetry and ignoring irrelevant information. The authors uncover further rationality concepts, both in the unary and in the newly emerging polyadic languages, such as conformity, spectrum exchangeability, similarity and language invariance. For logicians with a mathematical grounding, this book provides a complete self-contained course on the subject, taking the reader from the basics up to the most recent developments. It is also a useful reference for a wider audience from philosophy and computer science"-- Provided by publisher

• Introduction / Luca Castagnoli and Paolo Fait
• I. The development of logic in antiquity. The prehistory of logic / Nicholas Denyer ; Aristotle and Theophrastas / Paolo Fait ; Megarians and Stoics / Karlheinz Hülser ; Late antiquity / Benjamin Morison
• II. Key themes. Truth as a logical property and the laws of being true / Walter Cavini ; Definition / Michael Ferejohn ; Terms and propositions / Paolo Crivelli ; Validity and syllogism / Luca Castagnoli and Paolo Fait ; Demonstration / Alexander Brown ; Modalities and modal logic / Marko Malink ; Fallacies and paradoxes / Luca Castagnoli ; Logic in ancient rhetoric / Christoff Rapp ; Ancient logic and ancient mathematics / Reviel Netz
• III. The legacy of ancient logic. Ancient logic in the middle ages / John Merenbon ; Ancient logic from the Rennaissance to the birth of mathematical logic / Mirella Capozzi and Leila Haaparanta ; Ancient logic today / John Woods

"In late antiquity interpreters of Plato's philosophy insisted that the whole of logic was already present in his dialogues. All kinds of syllogisms were used by Socrates and his interlocutors, and it was left to Aristotle and his successors only to name, classify and formalise them.1 This approach remained popular among interpreters until the first half of the 20th century.2 More recent historians of logic have protested that in order to 'discover' or 'invent' logic it is not sufficient to reason according to certain valid patterns, or to represent someone acting in this way in a fictional dialogue. But there is a sense in which Plato did play a key role in the birth and development of ancient logic, a role which is often underplayed in histories of logic. In his dialogues Plato identified and explored a number of central philosophical issues to which logical concepts and methods offered powerful responses, if not definitive solutions. In this way, he was an essential catalyst for the birth of logic: if ancient logic was the promised land, Plato was its Moses. He never set foot in it, but enabled others to see the destination. Of course, when setting this agenda, Plato was not operating in a philosophical vacuum; often he was engaging in original ways with problems raised or foreshadowed by some of his predecessors and contemporaries (on the 'prehistory' of logic see CHAPTER 1 - DENYER)"-- Provided by publisher